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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PEGGY B. ODAK, ) 
) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
-vs- ) 
PERRY D. ODAK, ) 
) Case No. 980133 CA 
Defendant/Appellant. ) Priority No. 15 
I. JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 
78-2a-3(2)(i) Utah Code Annotated and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure as this is an appeal from a final order of 
the district court denying Appellant's motion for a contempt order. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court commit error in making an 
evidentiary finding of fact that Appellant had not proven 
defamation by a preponderance of the evidence without allowing the 
parties to present any evidence? 
2. Did the district court commit error by implicitly 
requiring Appellant to prove defamation rather than denigration 
which was the conduct prohibited by the Decree of Divorce? 
These issues are purely issues of law which are reviewed 
for correctness. See, Drake v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 
177, 181 (Utah 1997). 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceedings Below. 
On February 18, 1992, Plaintiff/Appellee Peggy D. Odak 
("Mrs. Odak") filed a complaint for divorce against 
Defendant/Appellant Perry D. Odak ("Mr. Odak") in the Third 
District Court for Summit County, Utah. [R. 1-3] On April 8, 
1992, a Decree of Divorce was entered between the parties. [R. 
198-214] Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, Mr. Odak was required 
to pay Mrs. Odak spousal support in the amount of no less than 
$5,000.00 per month from April, 1992 through March, 1999. [R. 205-
206] . Mr. Odak was also obligated to indemnify Mrs. Odak from any 
liability on a possible claim by the Internal Revenue Service (the 
"IRS") on the parties' joint 1983 federal income tax return for 
$290,346.00 of allegedly improper interest deductions relating to 
the purchase of a Pinnacle condominium in Deer Valley, Utah, 
although the parties believed it was unlikely the IRS would pursue 
such a claim. [R. 200-201, 267-68] 
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In 1993, the IRS levied a claim in excess of $700,000.00 
against the parties with respect to their joint tax return for 
1983. [R. 268] Mr. Odak retained counsel and commenced a legal 
challenge to the levy which took several years to successfully 
resolve. Commencing in 1995, the IRS began garnishing all but 
$533.33 of the monthly spousal support payments due from Mr. Odak 
to Mrs. Odak. [R. 268-69, 328-29] Further, the IRS would not 
allow Mr. Odak to make any additional payments to Mrs. Odak until 
the purported tax obligation was satisfied. [R. 268-69] 
In June, 1995, Mrs. Odak filed a motion for an order to 
show cause why Mr. Odak should not be held in contempt of court for 
his failure to make the spousal support payments garnished by the 
IRS. [R. 216-17]. The matter was heard on October 23, 1995. 
Judgment was entered against Mr. Odak for past spousal support in 
the amount of $31,266.62 plus attorney's fees and other amounts. 
No contempt order was entered. [R. 306-07] 
In October, 1996, Mrs. Odak noticed a hearing for November 
12, 1996, seeking the entry of another judgment against Mr. Odak 
for the amount of spousal support payments garnished by the IRS 
since the date of the prior judgment. Mrs. Odak also sought an 
order holding Mr. Odak in contempt of court for his failure to make 
the payments. At the November 12 hearing, the court ordered 
judgment entered against Mr. Odak for the additional spousal 
support payments that had become due in the amount of $58,066.58 
and for other amounts, but denied the motion for contempt on the 
basis that Mr. Odak had not willfully failed to pay spousal support 
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payments. The court ordered that in the event the judgments for 
spousal support were not paid by April 30, 1997, that Mrs. Odak 
could schedule an evidentiary hearing to further consider the issue 
of contempt. [R. 339-41] 
The judgments for spousal support were not paid by Mr. Odak 
by April 30, 1997 because of the continuing litigation with the 
IRS.1 Accordingly, in April, 1997, Mrs. Odak noticed a hearing on 
an order to show cause re contempt. [R. 314] 
In June, 1997, Mr. Odak filed two motions. First, Mr. Odak 
filed a motion for a contempt order against Mrs. Odak for violating 
the provision in the divorce decree prohibiting the parties from 
denigrating one another. Second, Mr. Odak filed a motion to 
terminate spousal support based upon Mrs. Odak's alleged 
cohabitation with another man. [R. 319-27] 
All of these motions were heard by the Honorable Pat B. 
Brian on October 30, 1997. Judge Brian determined that he would 
listen to brief offers of proof from counsel of the evidence the 
parties were prepared to present and then determine whether he 
wanted to hear evidence. [R. 409] The court did not hear any 
evidence after receiving the offers of proof. Instead, the court 
immediately ruled, denying Mr. Odak's motion to terminate spousal 
1
 Mr. Odak's challenge of the IRS levy was ultimately 
successful. After spending in excess of $100,000.00 in attorney's 
fees and costs, Mr. Odak obtained a summary judgment against the 
IRS in early 1997, determining that the IRS levy was wrongful and 
that the taxes were not owed. The IRS filed an appeal, but then 
dropped the appeal on or about September 1, 1997. As soon as the 
summary judgment was obtained, Mr. Odak continued paying spousal 
support to Mrs. Odak. The judgments for past spousal support were 
also paid. [R. 328-29, 412] 
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support based upon cohabitation; denying Mr. Odak's motion for a 
contempt order against Mrs. Odak, but entering an order mutually 
restraining the parties from denigrating each other; and granting 
Mrs. Odak's motion for another judgment for spousal support, but 
denying her motion to have Mr. Odak held in contempt of court. [R. 
381-84, 452-57] 
On March 3, 1998, Mr. Odak filed a Notice of Appeal from 
the court's order on his contempt motion. [R. 3 96] 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. The Decree of Divorce entered April 8, 1992 between the 
parties provided as follows: 
13. It is ordered that the parties not in any 
way denigrate each other publicly or privately so as 
to negatively affect each other's personal, 
professional or business relations, harm each other's 
professional reputations, or reduce each other's 
earning power. [R. 212]. 
2. At the October 30, 1997 hearing, the court proceeded on 
Mr. Odak's motion for contempt for Mrs. Odak's alleged violation of 
the denigration provision by taking offers of proof from the 
parties. The court did not take any evidence at the hearing. [R. 
408-58] 
3. Mr. Odak proffered the following evidence concerning 
Mrs. Odak's violation of paragraph 13 of the Divorce Decree: Mr. 
Odak had for many years been a top executive of a number of 
substantial companies. At the time of the hearing, he was and 
still is the chief executive officer of Ben & Jerry's Homemade, 
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Inc., a public company. It is very important that his personal and 
professional reputation remain unsullied. Mrs. Odak made a number 
of false and defamatory statements to third parties concerning Mr. 
Odak, including that (1) Mr. Odak was probably behind threats of 
physical violence to her; (2) Mr. Odak is powerful and capable of 
having people beat up or injured and every time something bad 
happens to her she wonders if Mr. Odak is behind it; (3) if she is 
killed or injured, Mr. Odak did it; (4) that Mr. Odak is 
vindictive, evil and dangerous; (5) Mr. Odak is conniving, devious, 
pays off judges and witnesses and if Mrs. Odak is killed Mr. Odak 
probably did it; and (6) Mr. Odak got Mrs. Odak's daughter-in-law 
fired from her employment with a bank. [R. 424] 
4. Despite the fact that the court did not allow the 
parties to present any evidence, the court (although finding that 
there was more than enough fault to be spread between the two 
parties, and imposing a mutual restraining order prohibiting 
denigrating statements) mcde an evidentiary finding on the record 
at the hearing that: 
The question of defamation simply was not proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence. And the Court 
finds that's true with any allegation of contempt 
asserted by both parties. [R. 453-54] 
5. The court subsequently entered an Order and Judgment, 
determining in paragraph 6 that: 
Similarly, with regard to tne Defendant's claim 
that he has been defamed, although bad blood exists 
between the parties, the Defendant has failed to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that he has been 
defamed by the Plaintiff. [R. 382] 
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6. At the time the motion for contempt was heard by the 
court, a separate lawsuit for defamation filed by Mr. Odak against 
Mrs. Odak was pending in Ohio where Mrs. Odak resides. [R. 4 54] 
7. After the court's order was entered purporting to find 
that Mr. Odak had not proven defamation by a preponderance of the 
evidence, Mrs. Odak filed a motion for summary judgment in the Ohio 
action, asserting that Judge Brian's ruling that Mr. Odak had not 
proven defamation by a preponderance of the evidence was res 
judicata with respect to Mr. Odak's defamation lawsuit in Ohio. 
The Ohio court agreed, and entered summary judgment dismissing Mr. 
Odak's defamation claim in Ohio. Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Mr. Odak requests that the Court take judicial 
notice of that decision, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Appendix B. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. Defendant/Appellant Perry D. Odak filed a motion for a 
contempt order below against Plaintiff/Appellee Peggy B. Odak on 
the basis that she had violated the Decree of Divorce between the 
parties by denigrating Mr. Odak. The court informed the parties 
that it would proceed to hear offers of proof from the parties and 
then decide if it wanted to hear any evidence before the court made 
its decision. Mr. Odak then made an offer of proof which was 
sufficient to show that Mrs. Odak had denigrated him in violation 
of the divorce decree. The court nevertheless erroneously 
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proceeded to make a factual determination that Mr. Odak had not 
proven defamation by a preponderance of the evidence without 
allowing the parties to present testimony on which such a finding 
could properly be based. 
B. The court erred in implicitly requiring Mr. Odak to 
prove defamation rather than denigration which was the conduct 
prohibited by the divorce decree. The finding should therefore be 
set aside. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY MAKING AN EVIDENTIARY 
FINDING THAT MR. ODAK HAD NOT PROVEN DEFAMATION BY A PREPONDERANCE 
OF THE EVIDENCE WITHOUT ALLOWING THE PARTIES TO PRESENT ANY 
TESTIMONY ON THE ISSUE. 
The district court did not permit any testimony on whether 
Mrs. Odak had violated the divorce decree by denigrating Mr. Odak. 
Instead, the court informed the parties it would take offers of 
proof and then decide whether the court wanted to hear any 
evidence. The court committed clear error in deciding an 
evidentiary matter which was the subject of disputed offers of 
proof without hearing any testimony. An offer of proof does not 
constitute evidence that can support a finding of fact. See, Tisco 
Intermountain v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 744 P.2d 1340, 1342 
(Utah 1987) ; Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 579 P. 2d 1251 
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(Nev. 1978) . It was fundamentally unfair for the court to find no 
defamation without allowing testimony to be presented. 
Mr. Odak's offer of proof was that Mrs. Odak had told other 
people that Mr. Odak was probably behind threats of physical 
violence to her; that Mr. Odak is a very powerful person and is 
capable of having people beat up or injured and that every time 
something bad happens she wonders if Mr. Odak is behind it; that if 
she is killed or injured Mr. Odak did it; that Mr. Odak is 
vindictive, evil and dangerous; that Mr. Odak is conniving, 
devious, pays off judges and witnesses; that if she is killed Mr. 
Odak probably did it and that Mr. Odak got her daughter-in-law 
fired from her employment with a bank. This offer of proof was 
sufficient to show defamation.2 It was clear error for the court 
to rule against Mr. Odak on this issue without permitting any 
evidence to be presented. 
The issue of whether Mr. Odak proved defamation by Mrs. 
Odak is not academic. Mrs. Odak utilized that finding in order to 
short-circuit Mr. Odak's defamation lawsuit in Ohio. Mrs. Odak 
obtained summary judgment dismissing the Ohio lawsuit on the basis 
that Judge Brian's finding of no defamation was res judicata with 
respect to the defamation claims made in the Ohio lawsuit. Thus, 
2
 Mr. Odak was not required to prove monetary damages to 
enforce the decree. However, even if he were otherwise required to 
do so, these statements are defamatory per se because they accuse 
Mr. Odak of criminal conduct and therefore damage is presumed. 
See, Baum v. Gillman, 667 P.2d 41 (Utah 1983); Allred v. Cook, 590 
P.2d 318, 320-21 (Utah 1979) . Moreover, Mr. Odak was not required 
to prove these statements were false. Truth is an affirmative 
defense which the defendant has the burden of proving. See, Auto 
West, Inc. v. Baggs, 678 P.2d 286, 290 (Utah 1984). 
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the net effect of Judge Brian's ruling was to deprive Mr. Odak of 
his day in court in his defamation lawsuit in Ohio, as well as on 
his contempt motion in the present case. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN IMPLICITLY REQUIRING PROOF 
OF DEFAMATION RATHER THAN DENIGRATION. 
Mr. Odak was not required to prove the tort of defamation 
in order to enforce the provisions of the Decree of Divorce. The 
decree was more broad. The decree ordered the parties to "not in 
any way denigrate each other publicly or privately . . ." 
[Emphasis added]. "Denigrate" is defined as follows: "to cast 
aspersions on: defame . . . to deny the importance or validity of: 
BELITTLE. . . " [Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1989)] . 
Even if it is assumed for argument that Mrs. Odak's 
statements did not technically constitute defamation, they 
certainly denigrated Mr. Odak. The court's ruling which seemed to 
require defamation instead of denigration was erroneous. Because 
the finding of lack of defamation was not required for the court's 
decision, the finding should be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that the district court's order should be reversed insofar as the 
finding of no defamation is concerned and the case remanded to 
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district court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether 
Mrs. Odak denigrated Mr. Odak in violation of the Decree of 
Divorce. In the alternative, the finding should be set aside. 
DATED this £jy-%ay of July, 1998. 
BURBIDGE Sc MITCHELL 
js odak\appeal\brief 
StepnenCfl". Mitchel. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed two (2) 
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Ann L. Wasserman, Esq. 
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426 South 500 East 
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By gulauX^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FILED DISTRICT COLJST 
T.'.i.-d JijQ-ida! District 
FEB 1 7 1998 
uaauiy u.erK 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-00O00-
PEGGY B. ODAK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PERRY D. ODAK, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Case No.: 92-43-11354 
Judge: Pat B. Brian 
-00O00-
This matter came on for hearing on October 30, 1997, the Honorable Pat B. Brian 
presiding. Both parties were present and represented by counsel. The Court having reviewed the 
pleadings, and having heard the arguments and proffers of counsel, and being fully advised, now 
makes and enters the following Findings and Orders: 
1. The Court finds that, as of October 31, 1997, there exist arrearages in the payment 
of alimony not already reduced to judgment in the amount of $31,568.00. Plaintiff is granted 
judgment against the Defendant in that amount, together with interest at the applicable pre-
judgment and post-judgment legal rate until paid in full. 
feOl-hZ -i-* 11 s- '.L J * 8 
0398 
2. Interest on the previously-entered judgments that has accrued should be calculated 
by counsel, and judgment shall enter for all amounts due through October 31, 1997. 
3. The parties are mutually restrained from making defamatory or derogatory 
comments about the other to any other person. 
4. The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence the existence of a cohabitation relationship between the Plaintiff and any other person. 
5. The issues of contempt raised by the respective parties are evidence that each bears 
ill-will toward the other. Neither is more responsible than the other, and the Court finds that 
neither has demonstrated contemptuous behavior of the other warranting judicial relief. 
6. Similarly, with regard to the Defendant's claim that he has been defamed, although 
bad blood exists between the parties, the Defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he has been defamed by the Plaintiff. 
7. Although the Court believes that the Defendant's action in Ohio should be dismissed, 
the Court recognizes that it does not have the jurisdiction to so order, and the Plaintiffs motion 
in that regard is denied. 
8. Regarding the Plaintiffs claim for reimbursement for attorney's fees and costs, the 
Court orders that all prior orders awarding attorneys fees remain intact. Plaintiff is awarded an 
additional sum of $10,000.00 as a partial contribution toward her fees and costs. However, if the 
Defendant pays all judgments for alimony arrearages, interest, and attorney's fees accrued to date 
on or before December 1, 1997, the award of $10,000.00 of fees will be rescinded, and the parties 
will be ordered to bear all of their own fees and costs not otherwise reduced to Judgment. 
2 
0899 
9. The Court finds that it would be reasonable for the Plaintiff to refrain from pursuing 
execution proceedings in the State of Vermont until December 1, 1997. 
DATED t h i s / Z . day of ~ [ <?^s} / / ^ J t / . 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
s
 -* / ; u;w - ,J "i ; ,. ?( ;*\ QC AM c,n\f%r ^ i . 
' , \ \T ^N r . n «•>. r'.'? 7 , , , r r Pi'-.^iCT/CIPCuIT 
. • : ; .;tMMi! courrv, S I A T - or UTAH 
/ / 
^r - ^ / 
'^JxthU 
Approved as to form: 
%^NORABLE PAT B 
ft? S > r t l 
Stephen B. Mitchell 
Attorney for Defendant 
flOf.2 ^ r; o 0400 
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IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT OF HURON COUNTY, OHIO 
PERRY D. OKAK, ) Case No. CVH-97-471 
Plaintiff 
vs. ) JUDGE EARL R. McGIMPSEY 
PEGGY B. OKAK, ) DECISION AND 
Defendant JUDGMENT ENTRY 
) 
DECISION ^'-^^^^JJ^S 
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant Peggy Odak's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
It does not appear to the Court that the facts are in dispute, but rather the legal 
consequences of those facts. The parties were divorced in Utah in 1992. There have been 
continuing post-decree proceedings in the Utah court, including a motion by Perry Odak 
for a contempt order against Peggy Odak for allegedly violating a provision of the divorce 
decree prohibiting the parties from making slanderous statements about each other. Perry 
Odak contemporaneously filed this tort defamation action in Ohio. The alleged slanderous 
statements were the same statements used as a basis for both the injunctive relief sought 
in the Utah court and the damages sought in this court. Perry Odak has not argued to this 
Court that there were separate and distinct slanderous statements that formed separate bases 
for the respective actions. On October 30,1997, the Utah court conducted a hearing on the 
claim that Peggy Odak was slandering Perry Odak and thereafter on February 17, 1998, 
entered an Order and Judgment finding "with regard to Defendant's [Perry Odak] claim that 
he has been defamed . . . the Defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he has been defamed by the Plaintiff [Peggy Odak]." An appeal of the Utah 
court's judgment is pending. Peggy Odak seeks herein to have Perry Odak's tort action 
dismissed on the basis that the Utah court's Order and Judgment of February 17, 1998, is 
res judicata of the defamation issue pending in this case. 
The Utah court's judgment is a final judgment for purposes of the doctrine of res 
judicata. Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno Utah App. (1987), 735 P.2d 387, 390. 
As such it is entitled to the full, faith and credit of this Court and is not subject to collateral 
attack. Litsinger Sign Co. V. American sign Co. (1967), 11 Ohio St. 2d 1; see 63 Ohio Jur. 
3d Judgments, Section 352 at 125-126. The issue raised by this motion for summary 
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judgment is whether the determination of the defamation issue for purposes of the 
enforcement of the divorce decree is res judicata for purposes of this tort action. 
This issue is answered by the holding in Grava v. Parkman Twp.( 1995), 73 Ohio 
St. 3d 379, 382 - 383, wherein the court stated: 
Today, we expressly adhere to the modern application of the 
doctrine of res judicata, as stated in 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, 
Judgments (1982), Sections 24-25, and hold that a valid, final judgment 
rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim 
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of 
the previous action. Therefore, we overrule the second paragraph of the 
syllabus in Norwood, supra, and overrule the second paragraph of the 
syllabus in Whitehead, supra, to the extent it is inconsistent with today's 
holding. 
Section 24(1) of the Restatement of Judgments, supra, at 196, 
provides: "When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action 
extinguishes the plaintiff s claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar * * 
*, the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies 
against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or 
series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose." See, also, 
46 American Jurisprudence 2d, supra, at Sections 516 and 533. Comment 
b to Section 24 of the Restatement of Judgments, supra, at 198-199, defines 
a "transaction" as a "common nucleus of operative facts." Comment c to 
Section 24, at 200, plainly states: "That a number of different legal theories 
casting liability on an actor may apply to a given episode does not create 
multiple transactions and hence multiple claims. This remains true although 
the several legal theories depend on different shadings of the facts, or 
would emphasize different elements of the facts, or would call for different 
measures of liability or different kinds of relief." 
Section 25 of the Restatement of Judgments, supra, at 209, further 
explains: "The rule of § 24 applies to extinguish a claim by the plaintiff 
against the defendant even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second 
action (1) To present evidence or grounds or theories of the case not 
presented in the first action, or (2) To seek remedies or forms of relief not 
demanded in the first action." (Emphasis added.) See, also, 46 American 
Jurisprudence 2d, supra, at Sections 535 and 537. The rationale for such a 
rule is aptly stated in Comment a to Section 24 of the Restatement of 
Judgments, supra, at 196-197:" [I]n the days when civil procedure still bore 
the imprint of the forms of action and the division between law and equity, 
the courts were prone to associate claim with a single theory of recovery, 
so that, with respect to one transaction, a plaintiff might have as many 
claims as there were theories of the substantive law upon which he could 
- 2 -
seek relief against the defendant. Thus, defeated in an action based on one 
theory, the plaintiff might be able to maintain another action based on a 
different theory, even though both actions were grounded upon the 
defendant's identical act or connected acts forming a single life-situation. 
* * * The present trend is to see claim in factual terms and to make it 
coterminous with the transaction regardless of the number of substantive 
theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be 
available to the plaintiff * * *; regardless of the variations in the evidence 
needed to support the theories or rights." (Emphasis added.) 
We hold that Grava's second application for a zoning certificate is 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Grava's second application is based 
on a claim arising from a nucleus of facts that was the subject matter of his 
first application. In both instances, Grava was attempting to construct 
exactly the same building on the same tract of land, which had fewer acres 
than Section 404.4 of the local zoning ordinance required. In fact, the only 
difference between the two applications is the theory of substantive law 
under which Grava sought relief. 
In Grava v. Parkman Twp. Grava had argued, as Perry Odak argues here, that his second 
action sought different relief. Grava claimed "the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the 
present action concerning his second application for a zoning certificate because this action 
involves a distinctly different method of obtaining relief than the previous action involving 
his first application. He argues that the facts necessary to obtain relief under Section 906.0 
are different from the facts necessary to obtain a variance." [Footnote omitted.] 73 Ohio 
St. 3dat381-382. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected Grava's argument as this Court must 
reject Mr. Odak's argument. 
In this case the issue of defamation in this case arises out of the same nucleus of 
facts that was the subject matter of Perry Odak's contempt action for slander in the Utah 
court. The fact that he seeks a different remedy here is of no consequence. The fact that 
he chose not to present his case more fully in the Utah court is not a matter that can be 
considered by this Court, just as this Court cannot review the merits of the Utah court's 
decision. The doctrine of res judicata bars Mr. Odak's action herein and Peggy Odak's 
motion for summary judgment must, therefore, be granted. 
JUDGMENT ENTRY 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Defendant 
Peggy Odak's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, Plaintiffs complaint is 
dismissed with prejudice and costs are taxed to Plaintiff. 
JUDGE EARL R. McGIMPSEY 
cc: James A. Laurenson, Esq. 
Charles M. Rosenberg, Esq. 
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